Understanding peace and restraint amidst ethnic violence: Evidence from Kenya and Kyrgyzstan by Jenkins, Sarah
1 
 
Understanding peace and restraint amidst ethnic violence: Evidence 
from Kenya and Kyrgyzstan 
Sarah Jenkins 
 
The recent local turn in peace and conflict research has revealed significant sub-national 
variations in the onset, intensity, and duration of violence in conflict settings, and uncovered 
complex patterns of participation and non-participation at the individual level. Situated within 
this research agenda, this paper seeks to understand the emergence of small pockets of peace 
and individual acts of restraint during episodes of ethnic violence. Based on qualitative 
research undertaken in two diverse contexts  – Kenya and Kyrgyzstan – the paper argues that 
strong, crosscutting social ties mediate and contain boundary hardening processes, creating 
opportunities for peace and restraint on the ground.  The paper makes three key arguments: 
that pre-existing ties of friendship, trust and reciprocity render interpersonal violence more 
difficult and encourage acts of restraint; that extensive and intensive interethnic interaction 
disrupts and breaks down us-them distinctions that are the foundations of polarisation; and 
that crosscutting ties facilitate coordination and cooperation amongst community leaders, and 
ensure that appeals for peace resonate on the ground.  
Keywords: Ethnic violence, peace, non-violence, restraint, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan 
 
Introduction 
 Historically, the overarching concern of conflict research has been to uncover the causes of 
violence and to explain why organisations, leaders, and ordinary people instigate, perpetrate 
and participate in it. [1] Within this scholarship, there remains a strong tendency towards top-
down, macro-level perspectives that ‘focus on a polarized view of society’, and that fail to 
capture the complexity of violence dynamics on the ground. [2] However, the recent ‘micro-
theoretic’ turn in the field [3] has seen a welcome shift to theories that prioritise the 
disaggregation of conflict, and that have revealed significant subnational variations in the 
onset, intensity, nature, and duration of violence. Research into riots in India, for example, have 
sought to understand why some cities were affected, whilst others were not, arguing that 
‘institutionalised riot systems’ [4], electoral incentives [5], and interethnic civic associations 
[6] help to explain the uneven distribution of violence. Peace research scholars have simila r ly 
identified ‘zones of peace’ and ‘non-war communities’ in the context of protracted civil wars. 
[7] These studies have pointed to the importance of social cohesion [8], and local leaders and 
governance institutions [9] in facilitating peace.  Studies of civil war have examined the 
uneven, selective use of violence by rebel groups during conflict, exploring the ways in which 
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civilian-rebel relations can shape decisions over where violence is employed, against whom,  
and to what level of intensity. [10] And genocide scholars have begun to examine the 
complexities of individual participation in violence, identifying the role of social networks in 
driving recruitment and participation, [11] and exploring how group dynamics can influence 
individual choices to participate. [12] This paper contributes to this growing field of research 
in its focus upon the micro-level dynamics of ethnic violence, and it seeks to make two key 
contributions: firstly, it examines the relatively underexplored role of social ties in influenc ing 
individual choices to restrain or selectively employ violence. Secondly, it aims to help bridge 
the macro-micro disjunction that persists in the field, [13] by exploring how macro-level factors 
– in this case ethnic polarisation – are affected by micro-level social relations, and how this 
shapes the socio-spatial patterns of violence and peace. [14] 
 Thus, drawing upon episodes of ethnic violence in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, the paper addresses 
the following question: How can we understand localised peace and individual restraint amidst 
ethnic violence? As such, it speaks to two of the key problematics central to this special issue; 
namely, understanding the uneven distribution of violence across space, and understand ing 
individual restraint. The paper’s departure point is that ethnic violence must be understood as 
a socially embedded phenomenon, and it argues that strong, crosscutting social ties create both 
the conditions for, and the processes of, peace and restraint. The paper, then, is particula r ly 
interested in exploring Busher et al.’s fourth ‘internal brake’ on violent escalation within their 
typology: boundary softening. That is, the breaking down of clear us-versus-them distinctions, 
resistance to generalisations about opposing groups, and the maintenance of social contacts 
across the conflict divide. [15] In this respect, the paper reflects upon how cross-ethnic social 
ties can serve to shape patterns of restraint at the individual, group, and elite levels.   
 
The cases 
 Kenya has been plagued by a divisive ethnic politics since the colonial era as communit ies 
have benefitted disproportionately from having one of their own in – or close to – the seat of 
power. In this context of ethnicised neo-patrimonial politics, of potential marginalisation and 
exclusion, and of substantial horizontal inequalities elections have become high-stakes, 
winner-takes-all games that have repeatedly been a catalyst for violence. The December 2007 
polls sparked some of the worst ethnic violence the country has ever witnessed. These elections 
pitted the incumbent Kikuyu president Mwai Kibaki and his Party of National Unity (PNU) 
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against an alliance of leading politicians from Kenya’s other major ethnic groups – includ ing 
the Luo, Kalenjin, Luhya, Kamba, and Coastal communities – under the leadership of Raila 
Odinga and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). Given these party fault lines, the 
elections came to be understood as ‘all against the Kikuyu’, and with Kibaki trailing in the 
opinion polls many believed that it was impossible for him to win if the elections were free and 
fair. The campaigns were heated and anti-Kikuyu sentiment high leading into the election day. 
Significant delays and serious irregularities in the counting process, followed by a hasty 
announcement of Kibaki as the winner, sparked immediate violence and protest that quickly 
spread across the country. The next two months saw members of the Kikuyu community 
targeted by ODM-affiliated groups, and the former engage in revenge attacks, as the country 
spiralled into violence that left approximately 1300 people dead and over 700,000 displaced.  
 Just over two years later, an ongoing political crisis in the Central Asian country of Kyrgyzstan 
provided the backdrop for tensions between the titular Kyrgyz and the minority Uzbek 
communities in the south of the country. In April 2010, in the context of rising utility prices, 
increasing authoritarianism, and rampant corruption and criminality under President 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s rule, opposition protests and riots broke out in parts of the country . 
These culminated in the overthrow of the regime on April 7 and the establishment of an interim 
provisional government. Seeking a base of support in a region where many Kyrgyz remained 
loyal to Bakiyev, and with remnants of the former regime attempting to recapture power from 
the south, the interim government reached out to prominent Uzbek leaders. Their support of 
the new regime, and their active resistance against Bakiyev and his supporters, led to a series 
of isolated communal clashes across the south of the country between April and May of that 
year. The vacuum of power and political jostling had tapped into existing tensions over unequal 
access to land, economic opportunities, and political power that had underscored Kyrgyz-
Uzbek relations in the region since the end of the Soviet era. Tensions steadily rose and rumours 
abound that the Uzbek community – who were already seen as dominating economic activity 
in the urban centres across the region – were now seeking political power and autonomy. On 
the night of 10 June 2010, a confrontation between Kyrgyz and Uzbek men outside a casino in 
Osh city escalated rapidly, with large crowds gathering and engaging in violence.  Fuelled by 
this incident, and by subsequent unfounded rumours that Uzbek men had raped Kyrgyz girls in 
a nearby university dormitory, the violence quickly spiralled. Groups of Kyrgyz from nearby 
villages descended upon Osh and other major towns and cities in the south, whilst Uzbek 
communities mobilized in response. The ethnic violence was short-lived, lasting little more 
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than a week, but it saw the destruction of large sections of the affected towns and cities, several 
hundred people killed, thousands injured, and tens of thousands displaced.  
 In both of these cases, despite the spread of intense ethnic violence, some neighbourhoods, 
villages, and towns managed to maintain peace, with members of otherwise conflic t ing 
communities uniting to protect one another. Moreover, amidst the violence there is evidence 
of more ambiguous patterns of participation and individual practices of restraint, as people 
made efforts to resist violence and protect friends and neighbours. These spaces of peace and 
forms of restraint demand further attention and understanding.    
 
Methodology 
 This research adopts a multiple case study approach and employs an exploratory most 
different systems strategy in order to build theory. Kenya and Kyrgyzstan differ in a number 
of significant ways that could feasibly factor into shaping the nature and landscape of ethnic 
violence, including political history, regional dynamics, socio-economic structures, 
geographical features, and ethnic demographics. Despite these differences, both cases 
exhibited similarities in the patterns of violence and participation on the ground. The research 
was conducted in two distinct phases.  The field research in Kenya was carried out over 10 
months in 2009-2010, with over 500 semi-structured interviews conducted as part of the 
researcher’s PhD fieldwork. It employed a subnational comparative approach, selecting field 
sites in Nairobi, Eldoret, and Nakuru that had experienced high levels of violence alongside 
those that did not. The research in Kyrgyzstan was carried out over the course of five weeks in 
June and July 2016, with fifty-nine semi-structured interviews conducted in that time. The 
intention was to utilise a similar within-case comparison methodology. However, the 
sensitivity of the research, and the high levels of fear and suspicion that were encountered, 
made this approach more challenging. Whilst an extended period of research could have 
facilitated the building of trust in key field sites – as it had done in Kenya – constraints upon 
time and resources made this impossible. Upon advice from key informants, the project design 
was altered to include only areas that had remained relatively calm during the 2010 crisis. 
These included three small towns or villages near to Osh (Aravan, Kenesh, and Kara-suu), 
Kochkor Ata, a small town neighbouring conflict-ridden Bazar-Korgon, and Uzgen town.  
Secondary sources and literature have been used to compensate for the absence of primary data 
gathered in more violent contexts in this case.  
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 In both cases, a mixture of purposive sampling (based on place of residence), and snowball 
sampling was used to mobilise respondents. Interviewees were asked to narrate their personal 
experiences of the respective episodes of violence in their villages or neighbourhoods, before 
a series of more specific questions were explored to capture everyday lived experience and 
relationships across the ethnic divide. The interview material was further supplemented by 
observation and secondary source material, including human rights documents and government 
reports. In both cases, a research assistant was employed to assist with mobilising respondents 
and with translation where necessary. Whilst central to the success of sensitive research, the 
presence of assistants nevertheless impacts upon the research process, particularly in relation 
to who is mobilised and how they might respond to particular questions or issues. [16] In 
Kenya, my main research assistant was a male, Nubian youth from Nairobi. His ethnic identity 
was fortuitous in that he was regarded by almost all interviewees as ‘ethnically neutral’ in 
relation to the violence. However, his gender identity undoubtedly impacted upon the 
recruitment of female respondents, as well as shaping their responses. In Kyrgyzstan, a young, 
female Kyrgyz student was employed. As a result, it is important to acknowledge that while 
interviews with many Uzbeks appeared open and honest, the presence of my Kyrgyz assistant 
may have restricted or influenced the information that these respondents provided, or the views 
they expressed. In addition, while my assistant’s gender may have helped mobilise Uzbek 
participants more easily than a male Kyrgyz assistant, it did render interviews with young men 
who had potentially been involved in violence more challenging. Snowball sampling methods 
did mitigate this issue to an extent, but these groups remain underrepresented. Despite these 
challenges and limitations, however, rewarding interviews were carried out across the ethnic 
divides in both cases, and the field research has elicited some important and significant findings 
that demonstrate meaningful similarities.  
 
Social embeddedness and ethnic violence 
 Understandings of all human behaviour – including violence – must be attentive to the 
immediate social context in which it is embedded; [17] that is, in the complex array of social 
identities, ties, and relationships that make up our everyday lives. Processes of boundary 
hardening do not occur in a vacuum. Rather, they map onto existing social landscapes that can, 
in some circumstances, serve to undermine them and facilitate restraint. The subsequent 
sections explore three components of this process in the cases of Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, 
illustrating marked similarities across these two different cases. The first focuses on the 
6 
 
significance of strong ties of friendship in maintaining peace and shaping individual acts of 
restraint. The second explores how interethnic interaction can challenge ethnic ised 
perspectives, rendering such spaces more resistant to damaging generalisations about ethnic 
others. And the final section explores how both vertical and horizontal ties amongst local 
leaders and their communities facilitated peace and solidarity across the ethnic divide. 
  
Social ties, peace, and restraint 
 There is a widening consensus within the literature on social movements and political violence 
that pre-existing social ties play an important role in recruitment, radicalisation, and 
participation. [18] Recent micro-level studies of violent ethnic conflict, and particularly of the 
Rwandan genocide, have also drawn attention to this ‘dark side of social capital’, whereby 
involvement has been ‘linked to the interpersonal ties that bring and bind participants 
together.’[19] However, far less attention has been paid to how such ties might act as a restraint 
on violence escalation and participation. Indeed, people are embedded in multiple, complex, 
and often competing webs of social relationships that can pull in different directions, especially 
during periods of conflict and tension. Whilst some social ties can encourage violent action, 
others may mediate participation and build resilience. Stryker has suggested that the intens ity 
of relationships becomes an important factor when such competing identities call for 
incompatible behaviour. [20] Following these lines, then, this section argues that strong inter-
ethnic social ties remain important during violent conflict, and can act as mediators in processes 
of boundary hardening and as restraints upon violence.   
 In both the Kenyan and the Kyrgyz crises, residents of ethnically mixed areas noted that their 
villages remained cool and calm despite being ‘surrounded by war.’ [21] In these areas, 
residents united across the ethnic divide to protect each other and their properties, establishing 
interethnic patrols and erecting and defending barricades together. When asked why they felt 
their areas had been more resilient to the violence, the majority of interviewees pointed to the 
intensity and strength of interethnic relationships, stating that, ‘when you live together and you 
know each other well and you interact all the time it is very hard to hurt them.’ [22] Ethnic 
heterogeneity in and of itself is not sufficient to foster and promote strong crosscutting social 
ties; indeed, high levels of segregation can persist in heterogeneous contexts. But, as Rydgren 
et al. note, when multi-ethnic settings encourage close, everyday interactions, interethnic 
friendships and ties of reciprocity are more likely to emerge. [23] Interviews with those living 
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in villages that remained relatively peaceful in both Kenya and Kyrgyzstan support this notion; 
they describe strong interethnic ties of trust, mutual support, and aid that have developed 
through prolonged daily interaction, and they attribute the maintenance of peace, in part, to the 
presence of these relationships. Thus, in ethnically mixed spaces, ties of loyalty and reciprocity 
can build social capital across the ethnic divide, discouraging residents from engaging in 
violence against one another. As Malthaner notes, ‘loyalty based on personal relations…can 
be very resilient.’ [24]  
 Whilst high levels of interaction and integration can promote the development of strong 
interethnic relationships, that is not to say that those living in more homogeneous settings do 
not also have ties that cross ethnic boundaries. Of course they do; and these relationships  
continue to matter during episodes of violence. In fact, pre-existing social ties appear to play 
an important role in shaping individual decisions to avoid, resist, mediate, limit, or selective ly 
employ violence; not all ethnic others are considered to be equally legitimate targets. In both 
Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, friends, ‘good neighbours’, and individuals whose ‘otherness’ was 
more ambiguous, were often protected from attack. Friendships and close neighbourly 
relationships were the most oft-cited sources of restraint. Interview material from Kenya 
reveals countless examples of individuals secretly hiding friends or neighbours in their homes 
in order to protect them, and research in Kyrgyzstan illustrates a similar dynamic. [25] As one 
Luo youth surmises, ‘We were only fighting against those we didn’t know. If we had a friend 
who was Kikuyu we would protect him.’ [26] Similarly, individuals considered to be ‘good 
neighbours’ – those who helped others in the community – were also often protected from 
harm, whilst ‘bad neighbours’ were targeted. For example, a number of residents of Luo-
dominated 4B, Mathare, spoke of a Kikuyu man who was not attacked and remained in the area 
throughout the crisis; they cited the fact that the man had a posho mill and a water tap, and in 
everyday life he ‘helped people a lot with these assets, so with that good relationship in the 
slums, he was safe.’ [27] Similarly, a group of Luo and Luhya youth in Kibera explain, ‘it 
really depends on how you stayed with someone’ prior to the violence:   
L1:You know there was a man here. He had a very bad heart with people here. He was 
a Kikuyu and he had a water tap. He refused to give water to others here... 
LY1: He was not a role model in the community…If you took water from his tap he’ll 
beat you up. So people remembered what he was like, and when the violence came it 
was “Let’s go and attack him.” 
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L1: But the lady of that man was a good woman. She would help people with unga 
[flour] and things. So when the people from Gatuikera came to burn the houses here, 
we, under risk, we helped her. We did not help him, but we helped her. [28] 
 
In addition, local residents whose ‘otherness’ was blurred by virtue of their social connections 
or depth of integration into the majority community were also more ambiguous targets, and in 
some cases inspired acts of restraint. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, an elderly Uzbek man is 
reported to have been beaten by Kyrgyz youth in the Cheremushki microdistrict of Osh, but he 
escaped being killed, because ‘he speaks Kyrgyz well, he grew up in Otuz-Adyr village;’ [29] 
and in the Uzbek neighbourhood of Padavan, ‘all the houses were burned except one, where 
the wife of the owner was an ethnic Kyrgyz.’ [30] Similarly, in Kenya, a Luo interviewee in 
Mathare explained that his Kikuyu wife was not attacked by other residents because of ‘the 
way she is deeply in our system and she is talking fluently in Luo.’ [31] Moreover, against the 
electoral backdrop of violence in Kenya, political allegiances across the ethnic divide simila r ly 
blurred the boundaries of ‘otherness.’ Those who had supported the majority community’s 
favoured candidate during the electoral campaigns – openly rejecting the party associated with 
their own ethnic community – were more likely to inspire restraint. For example, one Kikuyu 
interviewee recalls,  
The group came to me, eager to kill me, but when they saw me they said, ‘No, no, no, 
don’t hurt him, he’s a strong ODM supporter, he campaigned with us as a driver.’ So I 
managed to escape death that time. They asked me, ‘Are you able to make it to your 
place? Can we take you there, we can give you a guard?...I told them, ‘I’m ok, I’ll 
reach.’ They left me and continued chasing the others. They killed many of them.’ [32] 
 
Thus, in some cases, the ‘us-them’ binary was softened by an individual’s social integration in, 
or political support of, the majority community, calling the legitimacy of violence against them 
into question, and encouraging forms of restraint.  
 The way in which restraint could be employed, however, differed across actors and contexts, 
and while some individuals were able to engage in open acts of resistance, others were far more 
constrained in their options. At the more visible end of the spectrum, some individuals were 
able to openly oppose, resist, and prevent imminent attacks against people they knew, 
appealing to other participants not to harm friends and neighbours. For example, upon 
encountering two Kikuyu friends being chased by a group of armed youth in his village, one 
Kalenjin interviewee recalls: 
I told the crowd, ‘Please don’t kill them. I schooled with them before.’ Just because I’m 
well-known in the area, they stopped and they weren’t hurt. They told those two boys, 
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‘If it were not for this man, you would be dead by now, and just because we know this 
man, if we didn’t know him then both you and him would be dead, so just run and 
go.’[33] 
 
What is notable here is the significance of the resister’s social ties with, and status amongst, 
the group: he is a well-known and respected figure. Indeed, in almost all related instances of 
successful outright resistance like this, the resisting figure was either an established and well-
liked member of the attackers’ social group, or a well-respected authority figure within the 
community. Attempts by individuals to prevent attacks by external armed actors – or attempts 
by those with limited social standing amongst, or authority over, members of the attacking 
group – were extremely rare.  Most interviewees noted that to openly resist in such 
circumstances would not only be ineffective, but could also lead to brutal, if not fatal, 
punishment. Thus, this form of restraint only occurred in very limited circumstances with quite 
specific group dynamics.  
 Another visible form of restraint involved the choice to moderate violence against 
acquaintances when encountered on the battlefield. For example, in the midst of one of the 
most horrific acts of the Kenyan violence, where thirty-five people were burned alive in a 
church in Kiambaa, one interviewee explained that his mother had managed to escape the fire, 
and as she was running away, the Kalenjin mob attacked and robbed her. One of his former 
classmates from school was part of the attacking group. As she fled, ‘she heard someone call 
her and when she looked back he was calling her to come….he told her that they would take 
her phone and money, but that he would give her the title deeds and her ID “because we know 
you.”’ [34] The circumstances under which individuals could exercise such restraint, however, 
was again significantly limited by the immediate group dynamics; when individuals were 
confident of their social standing and respect within the group, they might choose to exercise 
restraint such as this. But in contexts of greater uncertainty, such acts could invite reprisal or 
accusations of treachery, and individuals often felt they had little opportunity to exercise 
restraint. Indeed, one Luo resident of Mathare illustrates this clear tension. In his everyday life 
before the violence, he spent much of his time playing football with Kikuyu friends from the 
neighbouring village, and as such was not as well-integrated with residents of his own 
community. He was also married to a Kikuyu. When the violence broke out, he initially held 
back from participating in attacks against and looting of his Kikuyu neighbours. However, his 
lack of participation in the violence soon drew attention and accusations of being traitor: 
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There came a time when they asked me, ‘Why aren’t you joining us? Have you been 
sent with Mungiki [a gang associated with the Kikuyu] so that they can know our 
plans?’ I said ‘No’, but they know that this place [that I come to] is a Kikuyu place and 
they see me here every day, and so they thought, ‘This guy is planning something for 
us.’ So I decided to join them, I had a panga and I was with them, we were going door 
to door, looting and breaking. [35] 
 
Thus, unless an individual was well-known and well-respected by members of the attacking 
group, open resistance, restraint, or non-participation in violence was very risky.  
 Consequently, individuals most commonly utilised more subtle and covert forms of restraint, 
finding ways of protecting the lives and livelihoods of their friends and neighbours out of sight 
of other participants. As noted, above, many individuals in both the Kenyan and Kyrgyz cases 
hid people within their homes; others protected their properties, preventing their destruction or 
looting by outsiders by pretending that they owned or had appropriated them. [36] Others 
passed information on to friends in nearby villages, warning them of the time and place of 
upcoming attacks, or giving them code words to pass roadblocks safely. As one Kalenjin 
interviewee stated, ‘You are told to cut communication because this isn’t friendship now, this 
is about community. But you can’t sit there knowing your friend is there, you have to call him.’ 
[37] These patterns support Lee Ann Fujii’s research on the Rwandan genocide, where she 
found that out of sight of leaders and other participants, individual Hutu often acted upon pre-
existing social ties, helping and protecting Tutsi friends and neighbours. However, when 
surrounded by other participants, their options were more limited. She concludes that ‘it was 
social ties, not ethnic membership, that patterned processes of recruitment and targeting.’ [38] 
My own research demonstrates similar dynamics.  
 Thus, as Asal et al. note, ‘who you know and how well you know them impacts what you do.’  
[39] In ethnically mixed neighbourhoods and villages, where everyday interactions are high, 
close interethnic relationships can form and render violence against one another much more 
difficult. In more homogenous contexts, friendships and other close social ties of reciprocity 
continued to shape forms of participation, encouraging resistance, restraint, and assistance 
across ethnic lines. However, people’s options were often significantly constrained by the 
immediate social context, and open resistance was largely only possible when social ties 
amongst perpetrators themselves were strong, either through friendship or a relationship of 
authority. In the absence of these, individuals exercised restraint in more subtle and covert 




Everyday ethnicity and continuums of violence                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 This section moves beyond the level of the individual and of interpersonal relationships to 
examine the ways in which social relationships shape the everyday construction of ethnic ity 
and perceptions of self and other. It argues that ethnicised perspectives, prejudices and 
resentments – the very ‘stuff’ of polarisation and boundary hardening – are produced, 
circulated, and reinforced more intensively in largely homogeneous contexts, whilst extensive 
interethnic interaction can reduce ‘negative ethnicity’ in daily life. [40] Attention to these 
everyday expressions of ethnicity are important, as episodes of ethnic violence do not emerge 
in isolation from them, but rather are part of a continuum of ethnically conflictual behaviours; 
indeed, violence is more likely in contexts where pre-existing polarisation is high. [41] Thus, 
this section seeks to strengthen the bridge between the macro- and micro-levels of analysis by 
exploring how everyday social relations on the ground interact with a key macro-level driver 
of the conflict: ethnic polarisation  
 In both Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, expressions of negative ethnicity, prejudice and resentment 
permeate everyday life, pervading TV, radio, print and other media, and infusing discourse 
between people on the ground. These expressions contribute to the construction and 
maintenance of us-them distinctions and form the foundations of polarisation and boundary 
hardening in times of political tension. Indeed, the very act of ‘speaking prejudice’ perpetuates  
it, reinforces it, and further embeds it within mentalities and consciousness. As one Kenyan 
news article surmises: 
We have…left unchallenged our ethnic stereotypes to the point of allowing hate speech 
to thrive in our conversations. We have accused our political leaders (and rightly so) of 
making hate speeches in public gatherings, but we are all engaging daily in the same 
sin. [42]  
However, the occurrence of negative ethnicity is shaped by socio-spatial dynamics. Whilst 
relatively common and frequently unchallenged in in-group communication – or at least when 
a particular group constitutes a clear majority – in more ethnically mixed contexts it is far less 
acceptable; and when it does occur, it is often subject to local disciplining and contestation. In 
Kyrgyzstan, for example, interviewees indicated that whilst prejudice and discrimination is 
commonplace in segregated cities, such as Osh, in their own neighbourhoods and villages – 
where interethnic friendships and marriages are pervasive – it is not as apparent, and is 
challenged when it does occur. In Uzgen, for example, several interviewees noted that visib le 
interethnic tensions are quickly addressed: 
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If there are rumours about misunderstandings or that someone is saying that one ethnic 
group is better than others, the city people stand together to stop it or to quell the 
rumours. [43] 
Wa-Mungai’s analysis of the use of ethnic stereotypes in Kenya illustrates a similar point, 
highlighting the ways in which the articulation of prejudice and derogatory language is more 
constrained in ethnically mixed social settings. [44] This policing of negative ethnicity and 
prejudice plays an important role in building and maintaining trust and tolerance between 
members of different ethnic groups. As Kutmanaliev notes, ‘the absence of any bridging 
communication and contacts between residents of the Kyrgyz and Uzbek neighborhoods [in 
Osh] increased their perceptions and feelings of hostility, uncertainty [and] mistrust.’ [45] 
Thus, following the findings of intergroup contact theory, I suggest that increased, positive, 
intergroup interactions can reduce prejudice and intolerance between different communit ies. 
Consequently, in ethnically mixed contexts, appeals to ethnicised prejudices and resentments 
at times of political tension find far less resonance than in ethnicised spaces, where the 
circulation of prejudice, intolerance and resentment infuses everyday life.  
 Processes of boundary hardening are not limited to the pre-violence period however; indeed, 
violence itself often plays a constitutive role. Yet, the immediate social context again can work 
either to facilitate and encourage participation in violence, or to slow and restrain it. In more 
ethnically homogeneous spaces, for example, interactions with and observations of, co-ethnics 
and their responses to the crisis can tap into feelings of pride, duty and solidarity to the ethnic 
group. As one interviewee recalls: 
As we talked, a group of Kikuyu passed our place…singing songs…and every Kikuyu 
in the area was told to rise up and defend their country, their rights, their land, their 
farms and their family, what our forefathers left, because there is no way that it can be 
taken from us, it is for us to defend it…I was going to defend my people. I couldn’t stay 
in the house because I’m the child of heroes. [46] 
Moreover, as events are discussed and stories of atrocities committed by opposing ethnic 
groups are circulated, or as rumours of impending attacks spread, feelings of anger, hatred or 
fear can intensify and reify ethnic boundaries even further. Indeed, the movement of IDPs, and 
the stories that they relate can compel others to action. One Kenyan IDP, for example, recalls 
fleeing to an area where violence had not yet spread: 
They asked how things were there in Eldoret. I told them how the Kalenjin and Luo 
were killing Kikuyu there and I didn’t know they were getting angry at my 
story…When it reached night, I saw them coming with a box of knives and I wondered 
what they were for. I heard them say that “This knife, we must use it to circumcise the 




Thus, intra-ethnic interaction and the visibility of suffering can heighten the salience of 
ethnicity and strengthen the inclination to react to violence against the community. As a result, 
boundary hardening, and the impetus to participate in violence against ethnic others, spreads 
more rapidly in ethnicised areas. In ethnically mixed settings, however, whilst individuals may  
experience feelings of ethnic duty, solidarity, anger, fear, or resentment as violence unfolds, 
they are not exclusively reinforced through interactions with those in close proximity; rather 
they are tempered by ethnic others and subject to contestation and debate. Consequently, these 
spaces are more amenable to local appeals for peace and restraint, either by other residents or 
by local leaders.   
 The local structure of social ties, then, can serve to facilitate or mediate boundary hardening 
processes in periods of political tension and transition. In segregated contexts, relatively clear 
us-them distinctions and ethnic polarisation mark everyday life, rendering them more 
vulnerable to escalation along these lines at moments of uncertainty. Ethnically mixed spaces, 
on the other hand, facilitate the development of softer, more blurred boundaries between ethnic 
others, and as such, the boundary hardening processes upon which violence depends find less 
resonance. As McDoom points out, ‘Where you live matters because what your neighbours 
think, say and do also matters.’[48] 
 
Leadership and pockets of peace 
 While the social structures and relationships of everyday life can make peace and restraint 
possible, these conditions in and of themselves cannot wholly prevent or constrain violence; 
some form of organisation is required to sustain peace. Community leadership is crucial in the 
prevention of conflict escalation. [49] In both Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, prominent local figures 
from across the ethnic divides played a key role in fostering and maintaining calm within their 
communities. They engaged in a wide range of activities to maintain peace, including going 
house to house to preach peace; communicating amongst each other and with leaders in 
neighbouring villages to quell rumours; coordinating the building of barricades; establishing 
patrols within villages and neighbourhoods; negotiating with external armed groups; and 
strictly controlling and disciplining movement within their community. While the specific 
actors involved, and the tactics they favoured, differed across contexts, their respective 
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successes in facilitating peace and resilience was dependent upon strong vertical and horizonta l 
social ties between themselves and their communities.  
 In the Kyrgyz context, a wide range of formal, semi-formal, and informal governance actors 
adopted leadership roles in mobilising for peace, including district administration officia ls, 
police chiefs, NGO activists, neighbourhood committee heads, and other prominent members 
of the local community. [50] My interviewees emphasised the importance of village aksakals 
(elders) in particular, noting that ‘the fact that the aksakals got together and said they would 
not fight anyone, that kept the peace here.’[51] The success of these actors depended heavily 
upon strong vertical ties with local residents; it was important that they both knew and were 
well known by their communities.  Indeed, Khamidov et al. note that community leaders and 
officials in Aravan were able to prevent violence due to their personal relations with many 
residents, but the lack of comparable vertical ties in Osh made peace efforts ineffective. [52] 
Moreover, these actors play a central role in managing community issues in everyday life, and 
are particularly prominent in dispute resolution activities. As such, they are already recognised 
as leaders in the maintenance of social harmony. This traditional authority and legitimacy 
ensures that their appeals for peace are more likely to be heeded at times of tension. [53] As 
one interviewee noted, ‘the elders’ court here is very powerful and everyone listens to them.’ 
[54] Contrastingly, Kutmanaliev points out that in certain areas of Osh, there is an absence of 
this sense of traditional authority and of ‘community leaders who are recognized as such by 
the majority of residents’; he notes that this contributed to their lack of resilience to violence.  
[55] Thus, where elders and other community leaders know, and are well-known by, local 
residents, and where they already have established positions of authority in governing everyday 
life, there exists a greater capacity for encouraging restraint. In rural villages in Kenya, similar 
dynamics were noted as residents asserted that, ‘the elders told us that we must unite in this 
village.’ [56] Just as in Kyrgyzstan, elders in these contexts enjoy significant levels of authority 
and respect, and are central figures in managing local conflicts and community activities in 
everyday life. This facilitated the resonance of their appeals for peace when violence erupted. 
However, in urban slums, while elders, religious leaders and other traditional authority figures 
are present and active to an extent, their role and authority has been diluted by the presence of 
other informal governance actors. Indeed, in these highly insecure settings, gangs and vigilante 
groups often play a greater role in protection, security and dispute resolution within their 
communities. [57] When the violence erupted, it was these ‘boys of the area’ [58] who often 
took the lead in imposing peace within their territories. Indeed, it should be noted that such 
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groups relied much more heavily on repression, violence and threat than governance actors 
who enjoy more traditional authority. [59] As one vigilante leader notes: 
In the post election, this place was not affected because it is mixed up [ethnically], and 
we have a vigilante group. I was steer heading the vigilante group. We didn’t sleep and 
we didn’t allow anyone to come in…We decided if you start war here then we will put 
you out of this community and we were strong….There were some who wanted to do 
that, they formed a group wanting to start that but we were many and we were strong. 
[60]  
Members of these vigilante groups were not necessarily bystanders during the violence and a 
number admitted to engaging in violence and looting activities outside of their own 
neighbourhoods; however, they strictly disciplined any agitators within their own territories, 
and prevented external groups from entering the area in order to protect their properties and 
livelihoods.  
 The capacity for leaders to establish, impose, and maintain peace, then, relies on a foundation 
of authority, alongside strong vertical ties to local residents; they must know and be well-
known within their communities. Yet, horizontal ties that cut across the ethnic divide are also 
crucial amongst leaders, and in both the Kenyan and Kyrgyz violence they served three key 
purposes. Firstly, they provided opportunities for communication, building confidence and 
reassurance that no attacks were being planned. [61] Indeed, open communication and the flow 
of information at the leadership level helps prevent the emergence of a ‘security dilemma’ 
between ethnic communities. [62] Secondly, the visibility of interethnic cooperation amongst 
leaders establishes a norm of tolerance, sets an example for ordinary citizens to follow, and 
gives appeals for peace and friendship greater credence. As one interviewee in Aravan notes, 
‘the leaders did a big job at preserving peace…[they] showed tolerance.’ [63] Thirdly, the 
multi-ethnic nature of leadership within these spaces facilitated negotiations with external 
armed groups from either side of the conflict divide, allowing leaders from the same ethnic 
group to confront them and dissuade them from entry. One interviewee in Nigeria, Mathare, 
for example, explains, ‘we were protecting both tribes, whoever would come here. So when 
the Luos came we put Martin [a Luo] there and he talked to them, and then they just know that 
we were together. So we had no problems with anyone.’ [64].  
  Thus, informal governance actors utilised their pre-existing ties and connections to build trust 
across the ethnic divide, to inspire norms of tolerance and cooperation, and to protect the area 
from external attack. However, their capacity to mobilise residents for peace, and to silence 
any local agitators was dependent upon the presence of cross-cutting ties amongst residents 
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themselves. Indeed, one of the key ways in which leaders brought communities together was 
through appeals to a common identity that transcended the ethnic divide. In her research in 
Nigeria and Indonesia, Krause similarly argues that leaders ‘supported proactive “we-think ing” 
and alternative framings to the dominant conflict identities of Muslim versus Christian. [65] 
This bears striking similarities to leadership appeals in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, where leaders 
worked to construct more territorially-based identities. As one Kenyan interviewee recalls, 
‘Here our elders in this community called everyone and told us, “You are not a Luo or a Nandi 
or a Kikuyu anymore. We are Kenyans. We must come together to take care of our 
community.”’ [66] Such appeals have greater resonance in ethnically mixed areas. Finally, but 
importantly, in low-segregated areas, whilst there may be some local agitators, it is much harder 
for large, armed, mono-ethnic groups to form and to overwhelm advocates for peace than in 
more homogeneous spaces. 
 
Conclusion 
 While there has been a welcome shift to micro-level perspectives of conflict and peace in 
recent scholarship, the factors shaping individual acts of restraint amidst violence remain 
underexplored, and the connection between macro-level conflict drivers – such as ethnic 
polarisation – and micro-level dynamics are not well understood. This paper has sought to 
address this gap, and to better understand the emergence of pockets of peace and individua l 
choices to restrain, limit or selectively employ violence during episodes of ethnic conflict. The 
multiple case study approach and the most-different-systems strategy helps to build confidence 
in the applicability and transferability of the findings to other contexts; indeed, this paper has 
shown that there are striking similarities in the role of social ties across the two very diverse 
cases of Kenya and Kyrgyzstan. In both contexts, strong, cross-cutting social ties facilita ted 
forms of peace and restraint in three key ways. Firstly, they rendered interpersonal violence 
more difficult, encouraging individuals to avoid, limit or prevent acts against friends and 
neighbours. The ways in which they could exercise restraint, however, were constrained by 
group dynamics and the immediate social context; indeed, in the absence of a strong social 
standing amongst members of the attacking group, individuals tended to seek more subtle and 
covert forms of restraint. Secondly, cross-ethnic social ties can disrupt and challenge negative 
us-them distinctions in everyday life, rendering ethnically-mixed neighbourhoods more 
resilient to the polarising narratives upon which violence depends. And thirdly, horizontal ties 
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amongst local leaders, and strong vertical to their communities facilitate leadership 
coordination and appeals for peace. Thus, episodes of ethnic violence ‘are not fought in social 
vacuums. They are fought in social landscapes.’ [67] Social ties can strengthen boundary-
softening processes and act as an internal brake on violence escalation.  
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